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During the past decade, even with an increased emphasis on EU integration, the 
United Nations has retained a central place in Irish foreign policy.   Both political 
discourse and public opinion polls indicate widespread support for the organisation 
as a source of international legitimacy and as the appropriate forum to make major 
decisions regarding peace and security; international human rights; and development.  
This support draws from both the idea that the UN provides the most suitable forum 
and safeguards for a small state in the international system and also from the 
identification of the ethical basis of Irish foreign policy with the founding principles of 
the UN.  For the public at large the aspect of Ireland’s engagement with the UN 
which has the highest profile is that of service by the Irish Army on UN peacekeeping 
missions.  Acknowledging this An Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern’s speech to the 2005 UN 
summit began with the statement that “We have always placed the UN at the very 
centre of our foreign policy.  Many Irish soldiers have served under the blue flag, and 
some have sacrificed their lives in that noble service.”1   In addition, a significant 
number of Irish people have direct personal experience of working with the UN 
system through involvement with UN humanitarian agencies and with non-
governmental organisations working with, or funded by, UN agencies.  The high level 
of legitimacy enjoyed by the UN in Irish society is indicated by its high profile use by 
campaigners for a no vote in referenda on alterations to EU treaties in 2001 and 
2002.  Here campaigners contrasted their perspective of the future of European 
security arrangements with ‘traditional’ UN operations - most graphically captured by 
the poster during the referendum on the Nice Treaty that starkly said ‘Hello NATO, 
good-bye UN’.2   
 
Looking beyond the rhetoric this chapter examines the position of the United Nations 
in contemporary Irish foreign policy.  It starts with a brief examination of the first 
White Paper on foreign policy in the history of the state, published in 1996.  This 
paper indicates tensions between different policy objectives and also clearly 
establishes the priority areas of foreign policy. These four areas - peacekeeping; 
disarmament; human rights; and development are then examined in turn 3 .  To 
                                                 
1 Speech by the Taoiseach, Mr. Bertie Ahern T.D. at the United Nations General Assembly on 
Wednesday, 14 Sept. 2005. http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/index.asp?locID=200&docID=2157  
2  The first (defeated) referendum was held on 9 June 2001; the second referendum, which was passed, 
was held on 19 Oct 2002. 
3 The White Paper on Foreign Policy: Challenges And Opportunities Abroad,  
http://www.dfa.ie/information/publications/whitepaper/default.asp , para 5.8.   
The continued relevance of these four areas is indicated by the fact they are the only sub-headings used 
for policy on the website of the Irish Mission to the UN also see, for example, the speech by the 
Taoiseach , 14 Sept 2005. http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/index.asp?locID=200&docID=2157  
or address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Brian Cowen, T.D., to the 59th Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly, 23 Sept 2004, New York 
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analysis in more detail how Irish foreign policy works out in practise the chapter will 
then examine Ireland’s record on the security council during its term of 2001-2002.  
 
 
Tensions in Irish Foreign policy 
 
In the 1996 Government White paper on Foreign Policy, which remains the states 
primary foreign policy document, the UN is described as ‘a cornerstone of Irish 
foreign policy since we joined the Organisation on 14 December 1955”4.    In doing 
this it expressed support for the UN in the context of the values that underlie Ireland’s 
foreign policy.  The White paper clearly reflects the wider public perception of the 
ethics underlying Irelands foreign policy, it argues 
Ireland's foreign policy is about much more than self-interest. For many of us it is 
a statement of the kind of people we are. Irish people are committed to the 
principles set out in the Constitution for the conduct of international relations - 
 the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on 
international justice and morality;  
 the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international 
arbitration or judicial determination; and  
 the principles of international law as our rule of conduct in our relations with 
other states.5  
 
In making this statement it is clearly aligning Ireland with the fundamental principles 
of the UN.  The White Paper also discusses the way in which the government 
believes that these higher aspirations are essential to the self interest of small states, 
in that they form the basis of an international system in which small states can best 
function as economic and political units.  This is reflected in the assertion that 
It is precisely because Ireland is small and hugely dependent on external 
trade for its well-being that we need an active foreign policy. Ireland does not 
have the luxury of deciding whether or not to pursue a policy of external 
engagement. We do not have a sufficiently large domestic market or 
adequate natural resources to enable our economy to thrive in isolation. We 
depend for our survival on a regulated international environment in which the 
rights and interests of even the smallest are guaranteed and protected.6 
The argument that there is a conflict between the ethical basis of Irish foreign policy 
as expressed by its support for the UN and Irish economic interests has been 
dismissed strongly by the Government in recent years.  For example former Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Brian Cowen has argued against an analysis of foreign policy on 
the basis of values versus interests. He said it was not an either/or situation because 
small states could not compete in a power-seeking international system run 
according to realist principles. Ireland, he argued, ‘like most small nations has always 
known that a multilateral rules-based international order is in our national interest. 
We would like to think, and I believe with much justification that we have 
demonstrated this, that our commitment to liberal internationalism is also based on 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.dfa.ie/information/display.asp?ID=1587  
4 White Paper, para. 5.7.  
5 White Paper, para. 2.40. 
6 White Paper, para. 2.37.  
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principle.’7   In this he reflects the view of Robert Keohane who concludes that small-
state support for multilateralism is rational, because whatever the failures of 
multilateral action, small- and even medium-sized states have no hope whatsoever of 
making an international impact if they act alone. Small states acting within 
international fora can play a ‘systemic role’ in seeking to shape codes and rules of 
behaviour.8   
 
Although the overarching relationship between self interest and ideals in foreign 
policy may not be in conflict the relationship is not always one of coincidence: it also 
involves tensions when the pursuit of the economic self interest of the state comes 
into conflict with its ethical foreign policy stance.  Minister Cowen’s argument could 
been seen as an attempt to deflect criticism which surrounded foreign policy 
decisions which appeared to be based on narrow economic self interest.   Two recent 
examples of this tension have been seen in the stance of the Irish government on the 
invasion of Iraq and also the position they have taken on agricultural subsidies to 
Irish farmers.  The policy on Iraq which was critical of US plans to invade the country 
was muted by consideration of the importance of US investment for the Irish 
economy. 9    While the relatively good international reputation Ireland enjoys on 
development policy has been undermined by its strong protectionist stand on the 
question of EU subsidies for trade in agricultural products.10 
 
The White Paper also discusses reform of the UN system and the role it should play 
into the 21st century.  It expressed support for an enlargement and reform of the 
Security Council and support for General Assembly reforms to enable it to play a 
more important role in building international consensus on key issues.11   On peace 
and security it supported the maintenance of ‘the UN's capacity to deter aggression, 
including if necessary through enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter’ 
but sought a greater focus on ‘developing the UN's capability in relation to conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping and peace-making’.12   This position was continued in the 
build up to the 2005 UN Summit. 13   Ireland’s credibility on these issues was 
confirmed by the appointment of Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern as one of just four 
special envoys of Secretary General Annan to promote UN reform in advance of the 
summit. 
 
The White Papers four priority areas of interest for Irish foreign policy – 
peacekeeping, disarmament, human rights and development – are now examined in 
the light of the tensions that exist between the desire of the Irish state for a 
‘multilateral rules based international order’ and the pressures of realpolitik that they 
face. 
 
                                                 
7  Brian Cowen, ‘Challenges to liberal internationalism’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 12 
(2001), 1–5: 2.  
8  Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas: small states in international politics’,  International Organization 
23(2) (1969), 291–310’, p297. 
9  See, for example, Sunday Times (London), 23 February 2003; Business and Finance, 13 February 
2003.  
10 For an analysis of  Foreign policy in an Irish general election campaign see John Doyle and Eileen 
Connolly ‘Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: a study of the 2002 election in the Republic of 
Ireland’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 13: 151-166, 2002. 
11 White Paper, para. 5.47. 
12 White Paper, para. 5.28. 
13 See for example press release fro Minister Ahern, 21 Mar 2005 
http://www.dfa.ie/information/display.asp?ID=1719  
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Peacekeeping and the challenge of EU security 
 
Ireland has been a very significant contributor to UN peace support operations – in 
particular peacekeeping.  Indeed given the comparatively small size of the Irish army 
that contribution has been remarkable. In August 2005 for example, only Poland 
within the EU (or indeed OECD) had more troops deployed on peacekeeping 
missions worldwide than Ireland.14   Ireland’s deployments have not followed the 
pattern of other developed states.  In Africa – where many of the current large 
peacekeeping operations are deployed, the UN has had great difficulty getting 
commitments from developed states to provide troops.  There are now almost no 
European or North American troops on the African continent in the major missions 
under UN command.  Only in Liberia where Ireland provides 426 troops and Sweden 
provides just over 200 are there any significant numbers of troops from developed 
states.15  Although this reflects the regionalisation of peacekeeping to some extent, 
that policy is also a reflection of the failure of developed states to commit resources 
to peacekeeping operations. 
 
In December 2004, 771 troops from the Irish army were deployed internationally.  
This included 428 in Liberia, 45 on other UN duties, 208 under KFOR command but 
with a UN mandate in Kosovo and 53 with EUFOR in Bosnia again with a UN 
mandate.  None of these missions were in arenas where Ireland could be said to 
have a narrow economic or trade interests, but engagement of this type does boost 
Ireland’s international standing.  There are two key questions that need to be 
addressed on the future development of Ireland’s peacekeeping role - firstly, could 
Ireland do more and secondly, how will the current developments in EU security and 
defence policy impact on Ireland’s commitments in this area?   
 
On the first issue, it is unlikely that Ireland could significantly increase the numbers of 
troops on UN duty unless there was an increase in the overall size of the defence 
forces.  Keeping 800 troops abroad in effect means having another 800 in training 
getting ready to replace them and typically means 800 have just returned home – an 
effective commitment of 2400.  With only 8500 soldiers in the Irish Army, that is a 
relatively high proportion by current international standards, given other commitments 
for security, training etc.  There is an ongoing debate about the nature of modern 
military training and deployment and widespread agreement that European armies 
are relatively inflexible and immobile.  In particular, in Ireland there is a political 
reluctance to consolidate the army into a much smaller number of barracks which 
greatly reduces the capacity for large scale training and is a drain on resources with 
no military rationale.  One effect of the maintenance of the current number of 
barracks is a reduction in the number of troops available for international duty.  If the 
government wishes to increase Ireland’s commitment to peacekeeping that will in 
reality require an increase in the size of the defence forces or a decision to close 
small barracks. 
 
The question of the development of EU security and defence policy is a more 
complex issue.  The current commitment of a maximum of 850 troops to international 
duty covers both the emerging EU capabilities and the UN.  The Irish army could not 
                                                 
14 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/  More generally there have been over 50,000 tours 
of duty, primarily by the Irish military, but in recent years also including members of an Garda 
Siochana 
15 Other large UN missions which Ireland has been involved in since the mid 1990s have included:  
the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Feb 00 to May 02 Irish commitment 
over that time: 181; UN Mission Ethiopia / Eritrea (UNMEE).  Nov 01 to Jun 03 total Irish 
commitment: 630. 
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sustain two separate deployments at that level if they were requested simultaneously.  
On one level there is a fear among some commentators that the pressure from EU 
partners to build an effective EU military capacity will lead inevitably to a reduced 
availability of Irish soldiers for UN duty.16  Given the reluctance of most EU states to 
serve under UN command or to serve in Africa this might lead to a significant change 
in Irish practice.  If the EU decides to engage in a UN mandated military mission 
there would be considerable pressure on Ireland to participate to demonstrate our 
support for an important EU development and inevitably this means fewer troops are 
available for other UN commanded operations. 
 
On the other hand it is possible that if the EU were to develop a military capacity of 
its own to carry out significant peace support operations then this would offer the 
United Nations a resource which it does not currently have.  States not currently 
participating at significant levels in UN peacekeeping might then feel more pressure 
to participate (and pay for) a EU led operation.   
 
For the Irish public (and internationally) it is unlikely that the EU can have the 
legitimacy which the UN possesses as a near universal organisation of states.  Given 
the previous colonial relationships of many European states with the global south and 
the growing gap of wealth between the global North and South it will be very difficult 
for the EU to build the level of acceptability that the UN possesses.  EU led missions 
will inevitably take place in a context of unequal power relationships and with 
suspicions that the EU is seeking to develop military muscle to match its economic 
power.   
 
At present there are a very limited range of operations carried out under European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and a judgement on the pressures they create 
for Ireland’s traditional foreign policy priorities can only be tentative.  The range of 
early activity has been in keeping with Irish foreign policy goals.  Ireland was 
particularly keen to see the civilian aspects of ESDP given a central role, given 
domestic concerns around issues of neutrality and the high levels of public opposition 
to the US invasion of Iraq.  In this regard, ESDP has had a range of activity other 
than purely military.  In fact, at present there is just one significant military operation 
(of 7000 troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina),  three policing missions (FYR 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and DRC), one on security sector reform (DRC), 
one on judicial system reform (Iraq) and a post peace agreement civilian monitoring 
mission in Aceh, just beginning at time of writing. 
 
So far there has been no tension between EU and UN responsibilities or authority.  
While Ireland was unable to take part in the first ESDP military mission in Macedonia 
as it did not have the UN mandate required by Irish law, this was a largely technical 
issue due to a threatened veto by China because of Macedonia’s diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan.  There was certainly nothing in the character of the mission 
which would have raised fears of an adverse public reaction in Ireland.     
 
The second ESDP military operation ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) was essentially a French led affair but it had a UN mandate and 
involved much greater EU-UN cooperation.  While there was clearly contact between 
the UN Secretariat and the French before a formal request for assistance was made, 
even allowing for that, an EU decision was made within a week of the UN request 
and enabling troops were on the ground within days – leading to the rapid 
                                                 
16 e.g. Andy Storey. The Treaty of Nice, NATO and a European Army:  Implications  for Ireland,  Afri 
Position Paper No. 3, 2001.  This was also the view expressed by the Green Party 
(http://www.greenparty.ie/)  and by Sinn Féin (http://www.sinnfein.ie  ). 
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deployment of about 1800 troops.  The Irish Army Ranger wing was offered to the 
French Force commander in the Congo but the offer was not taken up.  There was 
structured cooperation with the wider UN Mission in the Congo and the Force having 
stabilising a potentially dangerous situation in one locality, handed over to a UN 
operation.    This was clearly a limited operation even in the context of the ongoing 
crisis in the DRC.  Nonetheless it played a crucial role at a potentially difficult time 
and was a practical example of how well trained and well resourced EU troops can 
play a role within a wider UN context.  It led to a memorandum of understanding 
between the EU and UN on future co-operation in crisis management.17  This idea 
was developed during the Irish Presidency of the EU in 2004 when the Irish military 
authorities hosted a seminar on EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping, with speakers 
including Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General, Department of 
Peacekeeping and Major-General B. Neveux, Former EU Operations Commander in 
Operation Artemis.18   
 
The positive relationship between the EU and the UN in the early ESDP operations 
took place in relatively benign environments and they were limited in scale.  There 
are some suggestions that ESDP decisions in the counter-terrorism arena since the 
publication of the EU Security Strategy in 200319 have taken a rather narrower view 
and have stressed the criminal justice, border security, intelligence and military 
aspects over long term commitments to dealing with the underlying causes of 
insecurity identified in that strategy document such as poverty and 
underdevelopment.20  If a narrow view of security based on border controls, military 
force and economic power dominates ESDP in practice Ireland could find real 
tension emerging between ESDP activity and traditional commitments to a broader 
view of security. 
At present Ireland remains clear in its broad commitment to the United Nations as the 
legitimate organisation responsibility for international peace and security.  It seeks 
not only to defend but expand the UN’s role in that area.  As part of the deliberation 
for the 2005 UN Summit in New York Ireland strongly supported the strengthening of 
the UN’s right and responsibility to intervene and welcomed the agreement to 
establish a Peacebuilding Commission.  Given the strength of Irish public opinion on 
this issue it is likely that government support for ESDP missions will remain within the 





Since joining the United Nations Ireland has had a public commitment to 
disarmament and in particular nuclear disarmament.  However this is clearly an area 
where international progress has been very limited and where a small non-nuclear 
state has little leverage.   
 
                                                 
17 http://ue.eu.int/showPage.asp?id=606&lang=en  
18 Synergy between the UN and EU Military Crisis Management, Irish Defence Forces Publication, 
2004 
19 A Secure Europe in a Better World, the European Union Security Strategy agreed by the European 
Council on 12 Dec.  2003. 
20 John Doyle. Analysing the causes of “international terrorism”: situating European Security and 
Defence Policy 2004-2005.  Working paper in International Studies, Centre for International Studies 
Dublin City University, 2005 
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Apart from discussion on nuclear weapons, landmines have been the object of a 
strong international campaign.  In 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty) came into force and Ireland signed and ratify the 
convention on the first day.21  As Ireland only possessed 130 mines in 1997 – for 
purely training purposes –this was a symbolic decision – designed to maximise 
political pressure. 
 
Ireland was admitted to the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva) in 1999, most 
likely in response to the particular initiative taken the previous year  when Ireland 
supported the  Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, 
Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden “Towards A 
Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need For A New Agenda”.22   That declaration 
called for new initiatives on disarmament – including a commitment in principle by 
nuclear capable states to disarm, support for a comprehensive test ban treaty, a ban 
on fissile material, short-term de-escalation measures such as de-alerting and 
deactivating weapons and by the removal of non-strategic weapons.   Based on this 
Ireland was one of the sponsors of a resolution at the Conference on Disarmament 
(Geneva) which was passed with 90 positive votes, 13 against and 37 abstentions 
(which included most NATO members).  The resolution was brought to the UN 
General Assembly First Committee (disarmament) in November 1998 and again 
passed with most NATO members abstaining.  However without NATO support the 
resulting progress as a result of the resolution was very limited.   
 
During Ireland’s two year period on the Security Council there were no initiatives on 
disarmament – as the permanent five were under no particular pressure to do so and 
would have blocked any initiative.  There was a Irish contribution to an open meeting 
of the security council on small arms following the July 2001 UN conference on the 
illicit trade in small arms however there was no decisions requiring action taken at the 
meeting and no evidence of any follow up.23    
 
This general lack of progress on disarmament was reflected in the immediate 
reaction to the UN summit of September 2005 when Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Dermot Ahern in his only negative comment said “I share in particular the Secretary-
General's disappointment that it contains nothing on disarmament and non-
proliferation, nor on the need to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”24  
Therefore while the public commitment to disarmament has been maintained over 




Development and the role of the UN in generating consensus  
 
In a world with a growing emphasis on security the UN plays a key role in building an 
international consensus on development and utilises its position to secure stronger 
commitments from the developed world on aid, trade and debt relief.  Both in terms of 
the level of its aid spending and the wider context of its overall policy on aid, Ireland 
has been closely tied to the UN system.  The bulk of Irish development aid goes to its 
                                                 
21 http://www.icbl.org/tools/databases/country/ireland  
22 see statement of 9 June 1998  http://www.dfa.ie/policy/nuclearfreeworld.asp  
23 security council meeting 2 Aug. 2001. for report see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2001.htm  
24 Press Release 14 Sept. 2005  Dermot Ahern (New York) . text on 
http://www.dfa.ie/Press_Releases/20050914/1839.htm  
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priority programme countries, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa, and to supporting the 
work of Irish development NGOs.  As the development cooperation budget has 
grown in recent years the size of the contributions to the UN agencies has grown 
both in absolute and in percentage terms and is now larger than the contribution to 
the EU development programme.  In 2004 approximately €66 million was contributed 
to UN agencies, representing 13.5% of the overall aid budget and a 50% increase 
since 2002.  Following a “peer review” of Ireland’s development cooperation 
programme by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 199925 and 
the subsequent Ireland Aid Review,26 Ireland decided to target contributions to the 
UN to a much smaller number of agencies. It had funded 39 separate UN agencies in 
1999 but decided to focus its contributions on a more limited number thereafter.  The 
criteria for selection included fit with DCI’s own programmes and a focus on poverty 
alleviation.  While some small contributions continue, spending is now more focused.  
Among the larger contributions in 2004, UNDP received €12.9m, UNICEF €8.5m, 
UNHCR €7m, WFP €2.9m, UNFPA €2.5m, WHO €2.9m, UNHCHR €2.5m and 
UNAIDS €2.3m.27 These eight agencies therefore receive a total of €41.5m – nearly 
two thirds of the overall contribution to the UN. 
 
In addition to increasing its development aid budget Ireland has been a strong 
supporter of the UN’s single most important initiative in the development arena - the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000.  The actual goals originated in a 
1996 OECD report,28 but came to public prominence when the ‘Millennium Summit’, 
held in New York in September 2000 adopted a Declaration committing the member 
states to their achievement by 2015.29  While they have been criticised for their 
limited vision the success of the MDGs has been their capacity to re-engage the 
governments of the Global North on issues of development and to offer a simple 
message to the public to mobilise support thereby ensuring government action.30  In 
this regard the strength of the United Nations is clear, as even though there was 
nothing new in the MDGs they could be presented as a legitimate, universal set of 
principles around which pressure for reform could be build.  So, although opinion 
polls show a low level of awareness on the actual ‘goals’ themselves,31  there is very 
strong support for the policy principles contained within them.  McDonnell and 
Solignac Lecomte  suggest that because the campaigning has focused on the broad 
issues and not the “goals” per se the impact of the profile give to the MDGs by the 
UN is most visible in the high levels of support for increased aid, fair trade and debt 
cancellation within the EU and Canada.32   
Ireland has given the Goals and in particular Goal 8 which focuses on the 
responsibilities of developed states, a central place in its development policy.  The 
                                                 
25 OECD Development Cooperation Review Series: Ireland, no. 35.  Paris, OECD, 1999. 
26 Report of the Ireland Aid Review committee, Dept of Foreign Affairs, 2002. 
27 For further details and a comprehensive annual commentary on Ireland’s ODA see Helen O Neill 
Ireland Foreign Aid in 2004, Irish Studies in International affairs, vol. 16 2005 (and see previous 
volumes for each year back to 1979. 
28 OECD DAC Shaping the Twenty-First Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation".  
Paris: OECD, 1996.  
29 http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm  
30 For a supportive but critical review see Lorna Gold More than a Numbers Game? Ensuring that the 
Millennium Development Goals address Structural Injustice Trócaire 2005 
31  Ida Mc Donnell and Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte  Policy Insights No.13: MDGs, Taxpayers 
and Aid Effectiveness.  Paris: OECD, 2005.  
32 ibid poll figures taken from Special Euro barometer Wave 62.2 TNS Opinion & Social, 2005, 
Attitudes towards Development Aid, Brussels; and Focus Canada, Environics Research Group (2004), 
Canadian Attitudes toward Development Assistance, Ottawa. 
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development cooperation agency of the department of Foreign Affairs, Development 
Cooperation Ireland (DCI), states: 
The overarching objective of Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI) is the 
reduction of poverty, inequality and exclusion in developing countries.   …  
The eight Millennium Development Goals, agreed by the UN at a series of 
international summit meetings, identify some of the main causes of extreme 
poverty in today’s world and underpin the poverty reduction policies and 
activities of Development Cooperation Ireland … The Millennium 
Development Goals, and the specific targets set to enable their achievement 
to be measured, provide the context in which DCI priority sectors are 
decided.33 
The MDGs in Goal Eight specify a number of areas for action by developed states – 
chief among them action on debt cancellation, increases in official aid and progress 
on reform of the world trade system to make it fairer for poor and developing states.  
Ireland has supported calls for debt cancellation for many years.  Irish aid however is 
given as untied grants, therefore the Government did not have any debts to cancel 
which made it easy for them to be on the side of the angels on this issue and 
reduced their leverage on those countries who needed to act.  On trade issues the 
main policy contradiction for Ireland is around the question of export subsidies for 
agriculture – strongly supported by Irish agricultural interests but seen as unfair 
dumping in developing states.  There is a growing acceptance that further cuts in 
subsidies will inevitably take place, but Ireland has strongly resisted any attempt to 
reopen the current agreed set of agricultural reforms due to be implemented in 
stages up to 2013.34   One change that is marked in the Irish context is that the policy 
of agricultural supports which was considered a domestic/EU issue is now also 
discussed in terms of its impact on the developing world.  However given the indirect 
manner in which Ireland participates in world trade talks, (as the Commission takes 
the lead for the entire EU), and the absence of any debts due by developing 
countries, it is the level of development aid that was the key focus of domestic debate 
on the MDGs. 
The focus on aid was signalled by both the Taoiseach and Foreign Minister Brian 
Cowen, speaking at the UN Summit and General Assembly in 2000.  The Taoiseach 
made Ireland’s first public commitment to reach 0.7% by 2007 and asserted that ‘the 
specificity of the language and the timescales [in the Goals] mean that we can and 
will be held accountable for delivery. If we urge policy coherence and precise targets 
on the UN, we must be individually prepared to adopt the same disciplines’. 35  
Minister Cowen in turn stated that ‘our aid budget is both a test and a reflection of our 
commitment to the values and principles set out in the Millennium Summit 
Declaration’.36  That supportive attitude to the Goals and the focus on the aid target 
was confirmed by the Taoiseach again in 2003 when he addressed the General 
Assembly; ‘At the Millennium Summit, I committed Ireland to reaching the UN target 
for Official Development Assistance of 0.7 per cent of GNP by 2007.  Since then, 
Ireland has increased its ODA to 0.41 per cent, and remains committed to reaching 
                                                 
33 http://www.dci.gov.ie/challenges.asp  
34 Irish Times 3 Sept 2005 
35 Address by the Taoiseach, Mr. Bertie Ahern, T.D., to the United Nations Millennium Summit, New 
York, 6 Sept. 2000. 
36 Statement by Mr. Brian Cowen, T.D. Minister for Foreign Affairs, During the General Debate at the 
Fifty-fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations 14 Sept, 2000 
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the target by 2007.’37  When the government later announced that it would not after 
all meet the UN target by the deadline of 200738  it generated a very high level of 
criticism. 39    After a period of internal debate by the Government it used the 
opportunity of the 2005 UN Summit to announce a new commitment to reaching the 
target by 2012 – three years ahead of the deadline adopted by the EU collectively in 
a decision earlier in 2005.  The Taoiseach’s speech also announced an interim target 
of 0.5% of GNP by 2007.  The opposition parties responded with a promise to put the 
new schedule in legislation – something which Irish NGO’s had called for to make a 
future weakening of this goal more difficult.40 
Ireland’s current official development aid expenditure is 0.4% of GNP.  This 
compares to an EU average of 0.35% an OECD average of 0.25%. At present aid as 
a percentage of GNP ranges from a low of 0.16% from the USA to 0.85% from 
Luxembourg and Denmark.  Apart from the two top donors only Sweden, 
Netherlands and Norway meet the UN target of 0.7%.  Sweden, Luxembourg and 
Norway have subsequently committed spending 1% of GNP on aid with target dates 
ranging from 2006 to 2009.  Even though aid, expressed in absolute cash terms is at 
its highest ever level this year – it is well below the percentage figure of 0.5% of GNP 
which is found in the early statistics collected by the OECD.  The OECD has however 
expressed worries than some of the expected increases over the next year may not 
reflect real aid, for example it is estimated that a debt write off for Iraq could involved 
$15 billion which could be claimed as ‘aid’.41  This use of aid to meet foreign policy 
goals in the security arena is not one which has faced Ireland to date.  However there 
is likely to be a future debate on whether the costs of peace-keeping operations in 
the least developed countries could be included within the figures used to calculate 
aid and whether Ireland has reached the 0.7% target.  This would require a collective 
decision by the OECD Development Assistance Committee who determine what can 
be counted and is not a unilateral decision Ireland could make.  Indeed even in the 
event of an OECD decision Ireland would obviously still be free to decide to reach 
0.7% without counting any allowed military expenditures 
 
Ireland has been supportive of the UN as an institution which can build international 
pressure for higher levels of aid and a more coherent development strategy.  In 
keeping with the tension between idealism and self interest that runs through foreign 
policy, its support for the UN reflects  its belief that development and a reduction in 
international inequality is essential for peace and security as well as being ethical.  
Domestically it has also been able to use the UN agreed baseline standards as proof 
it is living up to its international commitments and to answer critics who argue that it 




Human Rights and the weakness of the UN system 
 
Irish foreign policy regularly asserts a commitment to human rights as one of its key 
priorities for working within the UN system.  However, there are well documented 
weaknesses in the UN Commission for Human Rights and one of Kofi Annan’s 
                                                 
37 Statement by the Taoiseach, Mr. Bertie Ahern T.D., to the General Debate at the 58th General 
Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 25 Sept 2003. 
38 Interview with Conor Lenihan Irish Times 8 Oct. 2004 
39 e.g. Irish Times 17 June 2005;  20 Oct. 2004; 1 July 2005 
40 Irish Times 16 Sept 2005. 
41  OECD DAC Chair Richard Manning DAC news 
    http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,2340,en_2649_33721_35317145_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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harshest criticisms of any UN body was reserved for the Commission when he said in 
his 2005 report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All:   
the Commission's capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly 
undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism.  … a credibility 
deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputation of the United 
Nations system as a whole.42  
 
In this regard Ireland welcomed the creation of a separate Human Rights Council to 
replace the Commission at the 2005 Summit, although at time of writing it is not clear 
if this will be more than a change of name. 
 
Whatever the limitations of the UN system in this area, Ireland’s commitment to 
international engagement on human rights is demonstrated by the setting up of  the 
Human Rights Unit, to coordinate activity in this area within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs immediately following the publication of the 1996 white paper.  The 
following year former President of Ireland Mary Robinson became UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.  There was considerable lobbying for the post and 
it was a measure, not only of Mary Robinson’s own standing, but of Ireland’s strong 
position at the UN that she received the support of the Secretary General Kofi Annan 
and the endorsement of the General Assembly.  Ireland was also elected to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights for the period 1997-99 and  in 1999 Ireland was 
elected to chair the Commission session in Geneva.  Minister David Andrews 
announced the election in Seanad Éireann saying 
  
It is with some pride that I tell the House Ireland has been elected to chair the 
session, one of the most important events in the human rights calendar. Our 
permanent representative in Geneva, Ambassador Ann Anderson, will 
conduct the proceedings and her election is a recognition of the consistent 
and progressive policies on human rights adopted by successive Irish 
Governments and a measure of her standing at the United Nations in 
Geneva.43 
Ireland was again elected to serve on the Commission from 2003-05 after a break of 
just one term.  Also in 2003 Judge Maureen Harding Clark was elected as a judge of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), following her nomination by the Irish 
Government.  She secured 65 out of 83 votes and jointly topped the poll.44  
Ireland also used its term on the security council in 2001-2 to promote human rights 
when diplomats made a number of interventions.  After the fall of the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan, Ireland argued against the prevailing on the council view that political 
stability in Afghanistan would be threatened if the new Transitional Authority was held 
too tightly accountable on human-rights issues.45  In this regard Ireland organised 
and chaired two informal meetings in October 2002 between Council members and 
two Human Rights Rapporteurs who had recently undertaken official missions in 
Afghanistan—the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan, Mr. Kamal 
Hossain of Bangladesh, and the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and 
Arbitrary Executions Ms. Asma Jahangir of Pakistan.  It is difficult to judge the 
outcomes of such briefing but they did reinforce Ireland’s commitment to the issue. 
                                                 
42 Annan, 2005 para 182 
43 Seanad Debates Volume 158 - 17 Feb. 1999, col. 356. 
44 The election was among those 83 states who had signed the ICC Treaty. 




After the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Committee by the Security Council 
under resolution 1373, the committee appointed a number of experts to assist it, 
primarily in the spheres of financial law and practice and legislative drafting. It 
decided, however, not to recruit an expert on human rights and counter-terrorism. 
The proposal to recruit such an expert was directly opposed by China and Russia 
and it was not actively supported by the other permanent Council members - the US, 
Britain and France.  Ireland, as a Council member with support from Norway, 
Mauritius and Mexico, pressed the need for a human-rights focus in the committee’s 
work and was commended by human-rights NGOs for this stance.46   
 
In another initiative, in June 2002 following the deaths of nearly 200 people in 
Kisangani in the DRC, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, 
addressed the Council in private—in ‘informal consultation of the whole’ 47 . This 
briefing was held following pressure from Ireland, and was the first time such a 
briefing ever happened on a specific country situation.  Again the outcomes of such 
meetings are difficult to judge but they do add some pressure on the Council to act. 
 
While the current international climate with its focus on countering international 
terrorism has narrowed the focus for human rights work Ireland has remained an 
active supporter of international human rights.  Even with the severe limitations and 
lack of effectiveness of UN human rights structures Ireland continues to see the UN 
as the primary forum for promoting human rights and has continued to support 
structural reform to enhance UN effectiveness. 
 
 
Ireland’s record on the UN Security Council 
 
In the last decade the period of Ireland’s membership of the security council is clearly 
the high point of their engagement with the UN system.  The Security Council is both 
the most powerful and most prestigious body within the UN system, bringing together 
the five permanent members with ten others elected for 2 year terms.  It has the 
unique capacity to initiate a range of instruments, including mediation and diplomatic 
pressure; compulsory economic sanctions; and military action.  Once the Council 
decides on a course of action it is likely that the action will gain widespread 
international legitimacy.  The Council’s key weakness is that any one of the 
permanent five members can veto a resolution, however this does not mean that 
elected members are powerless.  Using the veto portrays a state as isolated on an 
issue.  The USA, for example, has gone to great lengths to have resolutions 
withdrawn or opposed by other members to avoid having to use its veto.   As a 
resolution must receive nine positive votes in order for it to pass, the combined 
weight of the permanent five in favour of a resolution cannot guarantee its success 
unless they can also persuade some of the elected ten to support it.   
 
Security Council membership placed Ireland in a high profile environment where it 
was required to have a public position on a range of international issues.  While 
Ireland had been on the Council before this term took place in a much more insecure 
international environment and with a greatly increased Council workload.  There were 
                                                 
46 Info from private source 
47This is a UN procedure, whereby an informal ‘gathering’ of the full Council is held, in private, 
without constituting a formal meeting and thereby invoking Council procedures including a written 
record. Further information is available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/informal/summary.htm. 
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430 public session of the council over the two year period and permanent ongoing 
private consultations.  
 
Ireland’s election to the Council was itself a strong vindication of Ireland’s profile 
within the General Assembly – as states are elected by the entire UN membership.  It 
was not initially regarded as a strong candidate, lacking the diplomatic and economic 
strengths of its electoral rivals - Norway and Italy.  The relative ease of the victory – 
130 votes on the first round - was a result of a strong campaign certainly, but also 
Ireland’s positive image within the Assembly, based in part on its voting record. 
 
A recent statistical analysis of voting from 1990 to 2002 published in Irish Studies in 
International Affairs by Young and Rees paints an interesting picture of Irish voting 
patterns, that perhaps goes some way towards explaining the strong vote for Ireland 
in 2000.48 Young and Rees identify what they call a progressive voting bloc of Austria, 
Greece, Ireland, Spain and Sweden.  Of particular note was Ireland’s voting record 
on the key issues raised by the Global South.  Given the make up of the General 
Assembly the concerns of developing states feature much more strongly than in the 
security council.  Over the period 1990-2002 resolutions on Palestine, the Middle 
East more generally, apartheid (up to 1994) and colonialism represented 38 per cent 
of all resolutions, while human rights and disarmament represent another 31 per cent 
of all the resolutions.  While Ireland’s support for such resolutions in the 1990s was 
marginally lower than shown by an earlier study looking at the 1980s49 Ireland was 
still the EU state most likely to support such resolutions – marginally ahead of 
Sweden and Austria.   
 
The Security Council term provides an opportunity to analyse Ireland’s foreign policy 
across a range of issues, and allows a comparison between the rhetoric and practice 
in a situation where Ireland has influence.  In particular the Council term allows an 
examination of those areas where Ireland’s stated policy would bring them into 
conflict with the USA.  In particular, decisions on Iraq, Palestine, the International 
Criminal Court and Western Sahara, presented Ireland with difficult diplomatic 
decisions.50   
 
Iraq 
The issue of Iraq dominated the council during Ireland’s term. Up to mid 2002 the 
focus was on the impact of the sanctions regime, which had been in place since the 
1991 Gulf War, with many countries, including Ireland, seeking reform of the system 
to ensure a better flow of civilian goods into Iraq while at the same time maintaining 
military sanctions. After President George W. Bush’s 11 September anniversary 
speech to the UN General Assembly, 51   however, and under US pressure, the 
Council debates focused almost entirely on Iraq’s alleged programme of weapons of 
mass destruction.   On sanctions Ireland unsuccessfully argued that Iraq should be 
allowed to operate in the economic field as normally as possible, consistent with 
preventing it from rearming, and pending fulfilment of its obligations as set out in 
                                                 
48 Helen Young and Nicholas Rees, EU Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly, 1990-2002: the 
EU’s Europeanising Tendencies, Irish Studies in International Affairs vol. 16 2005., 
49 Michael Holmes, Nicholas Rees and Bernadette Whelan, ‘Irish foreign policy and the Third World: 
voting in the UN General Assembly in the 1980s’ Trocaire Development Review (1992), 67-84; Jan 
Wouters, ‘The European Union as an actor within the United Nations General Assembly’, Institute of 
International Law, K.U. Leuven Group Working Paper, (January, 2001). 
50 For a full account of the Security Council term see John Doyle ‘Irish Diplomacy on the UN Security 
Council 2001-2: Foreign Policy-making in the light of Day’, Irish Studies in International Affairs vol. 
15: 73-102, 2004.  
51  12 September 2002. 
 14 
previous UN resolutions since the end of the first Gulf War.52  At this time Ireland also 
argued that future sanctions regimes should have a specified time limit—to avoid a 
situation whereby sanctions can be kept in place by the veto power of one permanent 
member of the Security Council.  It was clear that there would not have been a 
majority to impose sanctions of that kind on Iraq in 2001 if a new resolution had been 
required. While this approach to sanctions was applied in practice from 2001 
onwards, it was not adopted as formal, standard Council policy because of US 
opposition 
 
Following the identification of Iraq by the US as an international threat, the 
unanimous adoption of resolution 1441on 8 November 2002 gave Iraq a ‘final 
opportunity’ to comply with previous resolutions on disclosure of its weapons 
programmes. The Irish government faced some domestic criticism for supporting the 
motion. In its explanation for having voted in favour of the resolution, the government 
explicitly stated that it was for the Security Council to decide if Iraq committed a 
‘material breach’ of its obligations, in accordance with the use of that term in 
international law, and that only the Council and not individual members could then 
decide what action should ensue.53  During Ireland term all of the government’s 
decisions and speeches that are publicly re-viewable, including numerous debates, 
were in keeping with Ireland’s public position of opposition to the continued use of 
such wide ranging sanctions against Iraq, continued support for the weapons 
inspectors and opposition to a unilateral attack on Iraq. 
 
After leaving the Security Council the Irish government, unlike France and Germany, 
took a muted and more neutral stance on the war. This was the real shift: from the 
position the Irish government took during 2002 while on the Security Council to the 
view it held in 2003, when war became inevitable. On this issue there was a clear 
tension between Ireland’s economic interests, given the country’s dependence on US 
investment, and the more principled foreign policy position set out in the 
government’s earlier statements on the issue. Once the Council term was over and 
there was a less immediate requirement to adopt and defend explicit positions, the 
Irish government sought to avoid taking a definitive position on developments 
following from resolution 1441.  In particular it appeared unwilling to publicly criticise 
US foreign policy, while at the same time continuing to emphasise the importance of 
Irish–US economic links.  However in spite of allowing US planes to land in Shannon 
airport Ireland did not actively support the war and the Government continued to 
express its preference for a UN mandated solution. 
 
Palestine–Israel 
Irish foreign policy has expressed sympathy with the plight of the Palestinian people 
and to supported political moves towards a settlement that recognises a Palestinian 
state. In December 2000 just before Ireland joined the Council a Palestinian-
promoted draft Security Council resolution calling for a UN Observer Force in the 
Occupied Territories could only get eight votes, the US therefore did not have to use 
its veto.  Even though the US lobbies heavily against resolutions critical of Israel it 
prefers not to use its veto because of the resulting negative publicity which affects its 
relations with the Arab world in particular. 
 
                                                 
52 See debate on UNSC resolution 1409, adopted on 14 May 2002, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ . 
53 Irish government’s statement in relation to this resolution is available at 
http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc97.htm  
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In Council debates Ireland articulated its position on the conflict in the Middle East 
around five key themes.54    
 the right of the Security Council to concern itself with the Middle East;  
 Israel’s right to security within recognised borders;  
 the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people;  
 condemnation of terrorism, the counter-productive nature of Palestinian 
violence, Israel’s excessive reaction to such violence and illegal Israeli 
settlements; and finally, 
 Israel’s right to defend itself along with its obligation to do so in accordance 
with international humanitarian law.  
 
Ireland abstained on a draft resolution in March 2001 which proposed UN observers 
arguing that no observers would in practice ever be deployed and that the collapsed 
peace process ought to be the focus of activity.  Whatever Ireland’s motivation it was 
open to the charge that it had been influenced by US pressure on this first key vote 
on the Palestinian question.  Although the resolution got nine positive votes it was 
vetoed by the USA.  
 
The Council debates on Israel-Palestine were dominated by US attempts to avoid 
resolutions critical of Israel, while at the same time because of the emerging ‘war on 
terror’ the US was felt constrained in its ability to use the veto, given its need for 
improved relations with the Arab world.  In December 2001 Ireland supported a draft 
resolution promoted by the Arab states encouraged three other non-permanent 
Council members to vote in favour. 55   The resolution simply reiterated Council 
support for previous resolutions and initiatives and supported the principle of land for 
peace.  The US however vetoed the resolution. This veto, the negative reaction to it, 
and a recognition that there was now a majority on the Council in favour of moderate 
motions critical of Israel were important factors in pressurising the US towards 
supporting the principle of Palestinian statehood. In March 2002, faced with a 
moderate Arab resolution that it would again have had to veto to defeat, the US 
introduced its own draft, which endorsed the principle of Palestinian statehood and 
welcomed the involvement of the Quartet as a mediating group in the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict.56 The US also introduced and supported other resolutions critical 
of Israel. However it by no means abandoned its traditional support for Israel.  In late 
2002, for example, following the killing of UN employees by Israeli forces, the US 
vetoed a draft resolution condemning the killing. The resolution was supported by 
Ireland.57  
 
The International Criminal Court 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) generated a real crisis on 
the Council. While US concerns about the court were known during the Clinton 
presidency, it became clear in the early days of the Bush administration that there 
would be active US opposition to the ICC.  By June it was known that the US was 
planning to veto the annual renewals of UN peace-keeping operations in order to 
pressurise the Council to agree to an exemption for US citizens from the ICC’s 
mandate.  
 
                                                 
54 For details see, for example, statements and vetoed resolution on 15 and 27 March 2001, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/.  
55  See Security Council report for 14 Dec. 2001, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ . 
56  Resolution 1397, based on the US draft, was ultimately adopted on 12 March 2002.   The Quartet 
was the shorthand used to describe the principle that mediation in the conflict would involve the US, 
the UN, the EU and Russia. 
57 See Security Council reports for 20 Dec. 2002, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/.  
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The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first to be affected by the US 
position of opposition to renewals, and only three short technical extensions of the 
mandate kept the mission in place until the crisis over the ICC was resolved.58  This 
happened when resolution 1422, agreed on 12 July 2002, effectively gave the US an 
exemption from the ICC’s mandate. At the open meeting of the Council on 10 July, 
Ireland had said that the US position was ‘not well founded’,59 that Ireland could not 
agree to the mechanism that the US sought and that Ireland believed the Rome 
Statute contained sufficient safeguards to prevent ‘politically inspired’ prosecutions.60  
Ireland and Mexico were the last two countries to agree to support the resolution, 
which was adopted on 12 July. While the UN resolution was condemned by human-
rights groups the controversy had the effect of raising the profile of the International 
Criminal Court.61   
Western Sahara 
Though not generating the same publicity as either Iraq, Palestine and the ICC 
Ireland played quite an important role on the issue of Western Sahara and it is an 
interesting example of active diplomacy on a relatively low profile issue where Irish 
activity made a real difference and where Irish motivations were not narrowly based 
on any economic interest .  
 
There was widespread acceptance that the 1991 UN plan for a referendum in 
Western Sahara on its constitutional future was unimplementable, due to differences 
between the occupying power, Morocco, which claimed sovereignty over Western 
Sahara, and the nationalist movement, Polisario. In light of this, former US secretary 
of state James Baker, acting as the personal envoy of UN secretary-general Annan, 
had produced a ‘Draft Framework Agreement’ that involved the appointment of a five-
year, interim government to be followed by a referendum in which every person 
resident in the territory for at least one year prior to the referendum could vote. The 
Moroccan government had ‘encouraged’ Moroccan migration into Western Sahara 
for many years and the inclusion of these migrants on the voters list would have 
almost certainly led to the integration of Western Sahara with Morocco. The US and 
France strongly supported Baker’s proposal. Polisario opposed this plan and instead 
promoted the 1991 UN plan for self-determination for Western Sahara.  
 
Ireland took a  principled position on this issue and was an important actor in the 
group that prevented the Baker plan from getting a majority on the Council. Ireland 
supported the right of the Sahroaui people to self-determination—as enshrined in the 
UN’s proposed Settlement Plan—and the right to exercise self-determination in a free 
and fair way. Ireland’s activity ensured that Baker’s Draft Framework never had more 
than six or seven supporters. The Council ultimately adopted resolution 1429, on 30 
July 2002, effectively putting off a decision on the Western Sahara issue for six 
months and this ultimately killed off the Baker plan. Ireland’s role in preventing the 
Council from adopting Baker’s Framework Agreement was widely recognised in the 
UN and was welcomed by Polisario. 
 
                                                 
58  These extensions were agreed in resolutions 1418, 1420 and 1421. 
59  Details of Ireland’s contribution to the meeting are available at 
http://www.un.int/ireland/scstatements/sc82.htm. 
60  See http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N02/469/11/PDF/N0246911.pdf?OpenElement . 
61  For details of this criticism see, for example, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-index-eng and 
http://www.amnesty.nl/persberichten/NK-PB0088.shtml, and see 




The Security Council term offered a real test of whether stated priorities in foreign 
policy of peacekeeping; disarmament; human rights; and development would be 
pursued in practice against the inevitable pressures faced at that level.  In coming to 
a judgement as to whether the traditions of Irish foreign policy were overly 
constrained by realpolitik during Ireland’s term on the security council it is clear that 
Irish diplomats displayed a consistent support for multilateralism, for the UN system 
and for a humanitarian and human-rights based approach to international relations. 
However, Ireland’s term ended just before the US decision to invade Iraq became 
irreversible. If Ireland had been on the Council at the time of the invasion, it would 
have found itself under much more pressure to conform to the US position on that 
decision than on any other issue with which the Council had dealt over the previous 
two years.  
 
Ireland, in common with the wider international community, was strongly supportive 
of the US in the post-11 September 2001 period. This can be seen most clearly in 
activity on the UNSC in late 2001, during debates on Afghanistan and in the 
discussions on the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). Even on those issues, 
however, there were some minor issues of conflict between Ireland and the US. For 
example, Ireland was part of the group that pressurised the US and Britain to brief 
the Council immediately after they started their attack on Afghanistan.62 The US had 
simply wanted to write to the Council saying it was invoking its right of self-defence. 
Ireland also sought (unsuccessfully) to institutionalise a human-rights perspective 
within the work of the CTC.  
 
Ireland, on many occasions, opposed US policy on issues of importance.  It did so 
repeatedly on Palestine, on sanctions against Iraq, and whether a second resolution 
was required to attack Iraq.   On other less high-profile but nonetheless important 
issues, Ireland publicly and regularly opposed US policy. Such issues included: 
seeking to re-engage the UN in Somalia; the US attempt to alter UN policy on 
Western Sahara; the effort in January 2001 to end the arms embargo on Ethiopia 
and Eritrea; and the wider debate on sanctions regimes in general, in which Ireland 
argued for specific time limits to be imposed for sanctions. In addition, Ireland sought 
to apply a UN mandate to the NATO operation in FYROM, against US and British 
arguments.  Although that initiative had little impact, Ireland did succeed in ensuring 
a larger UN operation in Timor Leste against the wishes of the permanent Council 
members who were seeking to curtail costs there.63  While Ireland ultimately voted to 
give the US an exemption from the operation of the International Criminal Court the 
US use of a veto to block renewals of peace-keeping missions put the other 
members of the Council in an impossible position – either to weaken the ICC or to 
stall peace-keeping missions indefinitely.  
 
In analysing Irish action other than on the Security Council, there are a number of 
important areas where Irish support for the UN has been very clear including 
involvement in UN peace-keeping and in particular in the commitment to African 
mission; support for Millennium Development Goals; increases in official 
development aid; financial support for UN agencies and a focus in other areas of the 
development cooperation programme on the poorest countries.  In the areas where 
there has been less tangible results – notably disarmament and human rights Ireland 
                                                 
62 Council meeting, 8 Oct 2001. 
63 See Doyle ‘Irish Diplomacy on the UN Security Council 2001-2: Foreign Policy-making in the light 
of Day’, Irish Studies in International Affairs vol. 15: 73-102, 2004 or reports of Council meetings on 
UN website for further details on these issues 
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has been a supporter of attempts to strengthen the UN’s role. There are other 
pressures on Irish foreign policy, a reliance on US foreign investment has clearly 
constrained an active policy on Iraq since 2003.  Within the EU there will be future 
conflicts on the extent to which emerging EU security and defence policy should 
reflect an attempt to deal with underlying causes of conflict and insecurity rather than 
simply a narrow focus on criminal law, border security and military responses.  
However in this fifth decade of Ireland’s UN membership there remains amble 
evidence of a genuine attempt to strengthen UN multilateralism as a key contribution 
to a more equal and secure world. 
 
